Abstract. We establish regularity for functions satisfying a dynamic programming equation, which may arise for example from stochastic games or discretization schemes. Our results can also be utilized in obtaining regularity and existence results for the corresponding partial differential equations.
Introduction
In [LPS13] , we studied regularity for the stochastic game called tug-of-war with noise. Recalling the recently discovered connection to the p-harmonic functions [PS08] , our results implied local Lipschitz regularity for the solutions to the p-Laplace equation for 2 < p < ∞. The approach was based on a choice of strategies for the players, and is thus quite different from the PDE proofs.
Our argument utilized symmetry properties of strategies, and a sharp cancellation effect produced by this symmetry, which directly allowed us to obtain a local Lipschitz estimate. It is a nontrivial task to extend this method to a more general class of problems where the perfect symmetry breaks down. Thus, in this paper, we develop a more flexible regularity method. As a starting point, we take a dynamic programming equation u(x) = 1 2 sup µ 1 ∈A 1 (x) R n u(y) dµ 1 (y) + 1 2 inf µ 2 ∈A 2 (x) R n u(y) dµ 2 (y)
as explained in detail in Section 2.1. This is a rather general formulation that covers a wide class of games; in addition to stochastic games it may as well arise from discretization schemes in numerical methods for partial differential equations, see for example [Obe05] . To illustrate our approach, we prove (asymptotic) Hölder continuity, Theorem 2.1, for several examples using the method. In particular, we prove the regularity for the tug-of-war with noise with space dependent probabilities, Section 5. In addition to the break down of the symmetry, the problem in applying known approaches is the lack of translation invariance. Furthermore, we study the tug-of-war with noise related to the p-Laplacian with the full range 1 < p ≤ ∞ in Section 6. Proving a local regularity result for this game may seem complicated, since the players can affect the direction of the noise, and thus it is not easy to say much about the noise distribution. However, the method of this paper is well suited for the task. We did not exhaust the list of possible examples that can be treated by the method but expect it to be useful in many more problems. Also, at least in some cases, the method can be improved to give directly stronger regularity results.
Our method arises from stochastic game theory even if for expository reasons we have eventually avoided stochastic arguments. The idea is that we start the game simultaneously at two points x ∈ R n and z ∈ R n , and try to pull the points 'closer' to each other. Here closer means, at least roughly, in the sense of averages and in terms of a suitable comparison function. To show that we may pull the points closer in this sense, we may consider the process in the higher dimensional space by setting (x, z) ∈ R 2n , and use the subspace
as a target. We use the following strategy: if our opponent takes a non optimal step we pull directly towards T . If the opponent pulls (almost) away from T , then our strategy is to aim at the exactly opposite step. The curvature of the comparison function gives an advantage to us. It is also worth noting that there is a freedom to choose among the probability measures in R 2n having the measures arising from the original games as marginals; cf. the setting in the optimal mass transport problems. Suitable choices will be helpful in the proofs. After finishing the paper it has come to our attention that couplings of stochastic processes have been employed in the study of regularity for second order linear uniformly parabolic equations with continuous highest order coefficients, see for example [LR86] , [PW06] , and [Kus15] . The method here has also some similarities to the Ishii-Lions method [IL90] , see also for example [PP13] . However, we do not rely on the theorem of sums in the theory of viscosity solution, but the proofs are built on the ideas arising from the game theory.
Our motivation to study the above problems is threefold: First, the study of stochastic games has received a lot of attention on their own right because of deep mathematical questions that arise and also due to their central role in many applications. Second, the dynamic programming principle can be interpreted as a discretization of the PDE. Thus, results can also be interpreted as results for the corresponding numerical schemes. Third, by passing to the limit with respect to the step size our results imply regularity results for the PDE.
There is a powerful connection between the classical linear partial differential equations and probability theory. In the nonlinear case, the connection between the games and Bellman-Isaacs equations was established in the 80s. However, a similar connection between the normalized p-Laplace or ∞-Laplace equations (which are discontinuous operators in the gradient variable) and the tug-of-war games with noise was discovered only rather recently in [PS08, PSSW09] . This connection has later been extended or utilized in several different contexts, see for example [AB10, MPR10, BCF12a, BCF12b, MPR12, APSS12, LS15, Ruo16].
2. The regularity method 2.1. Background. Let Ω ⊂ R n , n ≥ 2, be an open and bounded set. Denote by M the space of unit Radon measures on R n , and suppose that we are given
where P(M) denotes the family of all subsets of M . Our objective is to develop a regularity method for bounded Borel measurable solutions u : Ω → R to the dynamic programming equation
The heuristic idea is that u represents a value function for a two players zero-sum game, where the rules of the game are determined by A 1 (x) and A 2 (x). More precisely, when the game token is at x ∈ Ω, the maximizer can choose µ 1 ∈ A 1 (x) and minimizer µ 2 ∈ A 2 (x) and then the distribution of the next location is determined by the probability measure
. Then we can write
Let Γ(
2 ) denote the joint measures whose marginals are
2 . Then for any joint measure µ ∈ Γ(
2 ) we have
it holds that
Different couplings generate different dynamic programming equations as well as games in R 2n , and we may take the advantage of this flexibility in the proofs. For example, with suitable couplings a tug-of-war with noise described in [MPR12] corresponds to
in R 2n , where P x,z (h) is any isometry. Below we will prove regularity results for several nonlinear problems of the form (2.1). In all the examples of the paper, we require that µ i ∈ A i (x) implies spt µ i ∈ B(x, ε), where ε > 0 can be though as a step size in the underlying game. Throughout the paper, we denote by B(x, ε) an open ball centered at x and of the radius ε > 0. When the center point plays no role, we may drop it and denote B ε .
Theorem 2.1. Let (x, z) ∈ B R ×B R and B 2R ⊂ Ω . There exists δ = δ(n) ∈ (0, 1) such that if u satisfies (2.1) in the cases specified below, then
2)
As shown in [LPS13] this estimate can also be utilized in the proof of Harnack's inequality for the corresponding stochastic game.
Without a loss of generality, we may assume that z = −x, R = 1 and sup B 2 ×B 2 (u(y) − u(y ′ )) ≤ 1, by suitable translation, scaling and multiplication. Observe that this does not require translation invariance. After the simplifications we see that it suffices to show that
2.2. Steps of the method. As indicated in the introduction, our method arises from game theory even if for expository reasons we have eventually avoided stochastic arguments. The first step of our regularity method is to choose a comparison function f : R 2n → R that has the desired regularity properties. The key term in the comparison function we use to establish Hölder continuity in the examples below is C |x − z| δ , x, z ∈ R n , δ ∈ (0, 1).
The second step is to make a counter assumption: We wish to show that u(x)− u(z)− f (x, z) is small enough in B 1 × B 1 \T , and in particular smaller than in (B 2 × B 2 ) \ (B 1 × B 1 \ T ), and thrive for a contradiction by assuming that it is not.
As a third step, we write down a multidimensional dynamic programming equation for the comparison function f in R 2n by using a counter proposition.
As a final step, we derive a contradicting estimate for the dynamic programming equation of the previous step. Intuition based on game strategies gives guidelines how to obtain such an estimate by utilizing Taylor's expansion of f (x, z) in suitable coordinates.
Comparison function.
One of the key ideas of the proof is to use a suitably chosen comparison function, defined in R 2n . We use throughout the work the function
where C > 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1) are fixed later. The first term will give us the desired regularity estimate, and the second term makes sure that the estimate holds at (
It is well known that functions satisfying the dynamic programming equation can be discontinuous at the small scale. Therefore, to prove the claim in the case x and z are close to each other, we have to use an auxiliary annular step function. To this end, let N = N (n) be an integer. Then, set for i = 0, . . . , N
Observe that f 2 reaches its maximum
To see why we have chosen this f 2 , one should consult for example the calculations after (3.22). Our final comparison function f is composed of f 1 and f 2 as
We are going to produce estimates in terms of Taylor's expansion. It will be convenient to write the expansion in the form
where V is the space spanned by
The error term satisfies
if |x − z| > 2ε . Especially, if we choose
then in the case |x − z| > N ε 10 and |h x |, |h z | ≤ ε, we can estimate
(2.9)
Tug-of-war
We start with an example: we show how to obtain the asymptotic Hölder continuity for the value functions of the tug-of-war game by using the method of this paper. There would be simpler methods available for the tug-of-war or the random walk, but the work done here will pay-off later, as we will see. Indeed, we utilize these estimates later in more difficult cases of Sections 5 and 6.
The tug-of-war is a two-player zero-sum stochastic game played in Ω with the following rules. Fix the step size ε > 0 and an initial position x 0 ∈ Ω. The players toss a fair coin and the winner of the toss moves the game position to any x 1 ∈ B ε (x 0 ). The players continue playing until the game position leaves the domain Ω. At the end of the game Player II pays Player I the amount determined by a pay-off function F defined outside Ω. Naturally, Player I tries to maximize the outcome while Player II tries to minimize it, and thus the value of the game (for Player I) is defined as
Above S I and S II denote the strategies of Player I and Player II, respectively. If the players use strategies for which the game does not end almost surely and thus the expectation above is not well defined, we always set it to be −∞.
The value function of the tug-of-war game satisfies the dynamic programming principle
for x ∈ Ω, see [PSSW09] and [LS15] . Intuitively, we obtain the value at the point x by summing up the two possible outcomes of the coin toss with corresponding probabilities. The above equation is of the form (2.1) and we can follow the steps introduced above.
3.1. Multidimensional dynamic programming. Because u(x) − u(z) ≤ 1 in B 2 × B 2 and u(x) − u(z) = 0 on T , we see that
We also used the fact that
Next we will show that this inequality also holds in B 1 × B 1 \ T . This would actually yield (2.3) with C ′ (n) = C 2N and, eventually, the whole theorem. For the proof by contradiction, assume that
Then we are ready to write our first estimate: by using (3.10) and the choices above, we obtain
(3.13)
We estimate I 1 , and first observe that
This estimate follows easily by the above definition for M as follows:
Observe that here we used the counter assumption. Indeed, the points x 0 and z 0 may lie outside B 1 × B 1 \ T , but from (3.12) and the preceding discussion, we deduce that M gives us the upper bound. Furthermore, analogous reasoning using (3.12) gives us that
To be more precise, choose
f + η
and we obtain the above estimate.
Combining the estimates, we get
From this and (3.13), we conclude that for the desired contradiction it suffices to show that
Estimates. Next we show the validity of the inequality (3.16) for f = f 1 − f 2 , and for this we assume
for the constant C in f 1 (x, z) = C |x − z| δ +|x + z| 2 . The constant ω ∈ (0, 1) will be later defined in this section. The choice is designed to cover also Sections 4 and 5 with additional n-dependence ω = ω(n). If |x − z| is large enough, the validity of the inequality (3.16) turns out to follow in a straightforward manner by using the Taylor expansion for f 1 . The intuition coming from the underlying stochastic game will be useful in deriving the estimates.
In the case |x − z| ≈ ε, we will have to take the small scale jumps into account, and use the properties of the annular step function f 2 defined in (2.4).
Proof of inequality (3.16), case |x − z| > N ε 10 . Observe that the assumption |x − z| > N ε 10 implies that f 2 (x, z) = 0, and therefore, it suffices to show (3.16) for f 1 .
Let η > 0 and choose h x , h z ∈ B(0, ε) such that sup B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
We first let θ = 1/10 and assume that
Since |h x − h z | < 2ε, this also means that
This can be though as fixing a strategy in the game in R 2n . We get by using the Taylor formula (2.6) and the estimate (2.9) for the error term that sup B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
The final inequality above follows e.g. by the choices θ = 1/10 and δ ≤ 1/10. By using the assumption (3.17) for C, one observes that
Combining this with above estimates, we conclude that
In turn, if (3.18) above does not hold, implying that
the desired estimate can be readily derived from the first order terms in Taylor estimate. More precisely, if |h x |, |h z | ≤ ε, the share of the second order term and the error terms in Taylor estimate (2.6) can be roughly estimated by
(3.21)
Above we used the assumption (2.8) for N and at the last step the fact that δ ∈ (0, 1). This in connection with the Taylor formula and (3.20) gives sup B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
We point out that even if ε x−z |x−z| / ∈ B(0, ε), the estimate for inf above is valid due to continuity of f 1 . Again, by applying the assumption (3.17) for C and choosing ω ≤ 1/10, it is easy to check the desired negativity for this quantity. This completes the proof of the case |x − z| > N ε 10 .
Proof of inequality (3.16), case |x−z| ≤ N ε 10 . In this case we can use the following elementary estimate for f 1 : If x, z ∈ B 1 , and h x , h z ∈ B(0, ε), ε < 1, then
which immediately follows by using the concavity and convexity of the terms in f 1 . We further obtain sup B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
Since (i − 1) ε 10 < |x − z| ≤ i ε 10 for some i = 0, . . . , N , we have inf
Summing up the previous two estimates and recalling (3.23), we end up with sup
This proves the estimate (3.16), and thus (2.3) and finally Theorem 2.1 in the case of the tug-of-war.
Remark 3.1. By passing to a limit this implies Hölder continuity for the infinity harmonic functions, cf.
[PSSW09] or the proof of Theorem 4.9 in [MPR12], i.e. for the viscosity solutions to
where u i and u ij denote the elements of the gradient and the Hessian, respectively. As already pointed out, this is not our main motivation but we use the estimates of this section as a tool in Section 5 without repeating them there.
Random walk
We continue with another well known example: we show the asymptotic Hölder continuity for the random walk. Again some estimates in more difficult cases in Sections 5 and 6 are essentially the same, and we do not need to repeat the estimates there. Therefore this expository choice does not add much to the length of the paper.
We consider a version of the random walk where at x ∈ Ω the next point is chosen according to the uniform probability distribution on B(x, ε), and this is repeated until the process exits Ω. At this time the amount given by a pay-off function F defined outside Ω is collected. The function u is the expected pay-off of this process
This expectation can also be written as an average over the neighboring expected pay-offs as
This again is of the form (2.1) and we can employ the same method as above.
4.1. Multidimensional dynamic programming. Similarly as in Section 3, the equation (4.24) gives
Define P x,z (h) as a mirror point of h with respect to V ⊥ = span(x − z) ⊥ . The term I 2 (we later utilize this estimate in Section 5, which explains the notation) can be written as
Then by adding and subtracting we obtain
f (y, y) dy
where we again used the definition of M , as well as the counter assumption and the definition of f 2 to estimate −f (y, y) = f 2 (y, y) ≤ M .
From the previous estimate we conclude the desired contradiction if at every (x, z) ∈ B 1 × B 1 \ T it holds that
f (y, y) dy . 
We utilize the Taylor series (2.6). When integrating the series, the first order terms vanish by symmetry, and by the definition of the mirror mapping P x,z also (h − P x,z (h)) 2 V ⊥ = 0. This and the error estimate (2.9), gives 1
where by a direct calculation B(0,ε) h 2 V dy = ε 2 /(n + 2) and we assumed δ ≤ 1/10. Observe that since P x,z (h) gives the mirror point of h, the terms of the form (·) V ⊥ vanished. Moreover, by symmetry the first order terms vanished as well. Now, the assumption (3.17) on C with ω = ω(n) ≤ 1/(n + 2) guarantees the negativity of 10 − 
This implies
Furthermore, as before we use the rough estimate (3.22) for f 1 , implying that the inequality (4.25) can fail for f 1 at most by 3Cε δ . Combining this with the above estimate for f 2 , we conclude that
, where the final inequality follows simply by using again the size condition (3.17) for C and choosing ω ≤ 4 −n . This completes the proof of the case |x − z| ≥ 7 4 ε. For the final case |x − z| < 7 4 ε, observe that
Then we simply estimate that
f 2 (y, y) dy (4.26)
Then the desired inequality for f = f 1 − f 2 follows exactly in the same way as in the case |x − z| ≥ 7 4 ε . Again Theorem 2.1 follows. As an application, by passing to a limit, this implies local Hölder continuity for harmonic functions similarly as explained for infinity harmonic functions in Remark 3.1. By adjusting the comparison function, it would also be possible to obtain local Lipschitz continuity. However, for the consistency of the exposition we shall not pursue this analysis here.
Tug-of-war with noise and space dependent probabilities
Next we proceed to new results. We consider a tug-of-war with noise and space dependent probabilities: This is again a two-player zero-sum stochastic game played in a domain Ω. The rules are as follows. Fix the step size ε > 0 and an initial position x 0 ∈ Ω. The players start by tossing a biased space dependent coin with probabilities α(x 0 ) and β(x 0 ), α(x 0 ) + β(x 0 ) = 1. If the result is heads (with probability α(x 0 )), then they play a tug-of-war as described in Section 3. On the other hand, if the result is tails (with probability β(x 0 )), the game state moves to a random point in the ball B(x 0 , ε). The players continue playing until the game position leaves the domain Ω. Then Player II pays Player I the amount determined by a pay-off function F defined outside Ω.
Similarly as in the tug-of-war, Player I tries to maximize the pay-off while Player II tries to minimize it and thus value of the game is defined as
where S I and S II again denote the strategies of Player I and Player II, respectively. The usual tug-of-war with noise with fixed probabilities in [MPR12] , the tug-of-war in Section 3, and the random walk in Section 4 are special cases of this game.
Deriving the dynamic programming principle for this game is beyond the scope of the paper (for the fixed probabilities case, see [LPS13] ). Nonetheless, we directly take the dynamic programming equation
u dy (5.27) as our starting point. Heuristically we obtain the value at the point x ∈ Ω by summing up the three possible outcomes with corresponding probabilities. This equation is again of such a form that we can apply our method. We also point out that we have no regularity assumption for α(x). 
The terms I 1 and I 2 were already estimated in the previous sections, so we may focus our attention on I 3 . Choose a sequence x k such that
By a reversed reasoning, one can also verify that
f (x, y) dy .
To see this, write
f (x, y) dy
By combining these estimates, we get that
Summing up and also recalling the estimates from the previous sections, to obtain the desired contradiction it suffices to show that f satisfies the following three conditions at every (x, z) ∈ B 1 × B 1 \ T :
The inequalities I and II were treated earlier in Sections 3 and 4, and we may concentrate on the inequality III.
Estimates.
Inequality III, case |x − z| > N ε 10 . As in the previous case, it suffices to verify the desired inequality for f 1 . Let η > 0. Suppose that h x ∈ B(0, ε) is such that
(5.28)
Next we estimate infx ∈B(x,ε) f 1 (x, y) ≤ f 1 (x − h x , y) and use the Taylor expansion for f 1 to obtain
First, we consider the case, where h x lies close to ε x−z |x−z| . To be more precise, let
such that the estimate
holds for any δ ≤ 1 10(n+2) and θ = 1 10(n+2) by a direct estimation. Indeed, first observe that
and then take the small adjustments into account. Combining the above estimates, we obtain in the case (5.29) that
Using the assumption (3.17) on the size of C we get
where we choose ω in the bound for C so that ω ≤ 1 n+2 , and η small enough. This verifies the claim in the case (5.29).
In the remaining case
we utilize the first order terms in the Taylor expansion. To this end, by (3.21), the second order and error terms are bounded by δ 2 |x − z| δ−1 ε . Recalling (5.28) and estimating infx ∈B(x,ε) f 1 (x, y) ≤ f 1 (x − ε x−z |x−z| , y), we have
In the first integral above, we estimate (−h z ) V +(h z ) V = 0 and (−ε x−z |x−z| ) V = −ε. The second integral on the right hand side above is bounded by 16ε. Thus by using (5.30), we obtain
Again the final inequality follows recalling the bound (3.17) for C and choosing ω ≤ 1 10(n+2) . This completes the proof of the present case.
Inequality III, case |x − z| ≤ N ε 10 . In this case we again use the rough estimate (3.22) for f 1 in a similar spirit as before.
Consider then the quantity
for f 2 . We use the term B(z,ε) infx ∈B(x,ε) −f 2 (x, y) dy, and choosex such that the distance between this choice and y is suitably smaller than |x − y|, so that we get the desired estimate. For that, let us define for every y ∈ B(z, ε), P x (y) ∈ B(x, ε 2 ) such that
Then for any x ′ ∈ B(x, ε) it holds that
Then suppose that |x−z| ≥ 
Thus by the definition of f 2 and the fact that always x = z, it follows that
in the same ball. Using this and the fact that f 2 ≥ 0, we obtain
where the above inequalities follows from (3.17), the choice ω 2 ≤ 3 −n and the definition of f 2 . In turn, if |x − z| < 2ε 3 , then we use the fact that P x (y) = y in B(x, ε 3 ) ⊂ B(z, ε). This and the definition of f 2 imply
At the last step we again used (3.17) and properties of f 2 . This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1. Observe that the choices δ = 
where ∆ N ∞ u = |∇u| −2 n i,j=1 u ij u i u j with the notation of Remark 3.1, and 2 ≤ p(x) ≤ ∞. Indeed, the regularity estimate derived above allows us to pass to a limit, and thus to obtain estimates for viscosity solutions (see [JLP10] , as well as [Jul15] for a different version of the p(x)-Laplacian) to the above equation using game theory by setting
It is also worth noting that the approach in [PS08] and [MPR12] does not directly extend to the game of this section, since these papers utilize the translation invariance.
Tug-of-war with noise
The previous sections covered the game related to p-harmonic functions in the case 2 ≤ p ≤ ∞. In this section, we will include the range 1 < p < 2 by considering a slight modification of the game in [PS08] suggested in [KMP12] .
Choose a starting point x 0 ∈ Ω. The players fix their possible moves ν I and ν II with |ν I | , |ν II | ≤ ε, and toss a fair coin. If Player I wins the toss, then she tosses a biased coin. If she gets heads (with probability α > 0), the token is placed at x 1 = x 0 + ν I . If she gets tails (with probability β), then the token is placed at a random point in B ν I (x 0 , ε), which is a ball lying in the n − 1-dimensional hyperplane with the normal ν I . Similarly if Player II wins the toss, then he tosses a biased coin. If he gets heads (with probability α), the token is placed at x 1 = x 0 + ν II . If he gets tails (with probability β), then the token is placed at a random point in B ν II (ε, x 0 ). The game is played until the token exits Ω, and at the end Player II pays Player I the amount given by the pay-off function F . The value of the game is given by u(x 0 ) = sup
To avoid measurability problems, we can incorporate the continuous boundary correction in Section 4 of [LPS14] as explained in [Har16] . However as we are studying local results, we only give a local form of the dynamic programming equation, and take it for granted. By summing the possible outcomes of a single game round, we heuristically obtain u(x) = 1 2 sup 0<|ν|≤ε αu(x + ν) + β Then, let P νx,νz be a rotation, to be specified later, from the hyperplane determined by ν x to the hyperplane determined by ν z so that we may briefly Let us first assume that
Letting (i − 1) ε 10 < |x − z| ≤ i ε 10 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we also have inf T (f 1 − f 2 ) ≤ sup T f 1 − sup T f 2
for small enough ω(α) in (6.32). Combining the previous estimates, we end up with sup T f + inf T f < sup T f 1 + sup T f 1 − 6Cε δ − 2f 2 (x, z)
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
